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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954
has not as yet been answered. For instance, would a creditor, who
agreed to extend the time of payment, or to receive the payments in
instalments, or to accept a lesser sum in full satisfaction be estopped
if he changed his mind the following day? The case does not answer
these questions. An outright repudiation of the orthodox rule, which
would make an accord binding from the time of execution, would be
preferable in the interest of certainty and finality of commercial
transactions.
RicHARD W. BARTKE
CORPORATIONS
Assumption of Obligations of Purchased Business-Prima Facie
Presumption. If a partnership sells all of its assets to a corporation,
does the corporation thereby become liable for the obligations of the
partnership? This question was one of several arising in Mig & Logging
Supply Co. v. West Tenino Lumber Co.' There the plaintiff brought an
action, in part, for payment of debts incurred by a partnership which
sold all of its assets to the defendant corporation. The court relied on
the rule that a corporation is not liable for the partnership obligations
where no showing is made that it either expressly or impliedly assumed
them. Because of plaintiff's failure to make such an allegation, defend-
ant's demurrer to this particular part of the complaint was sustained.
By way of dictum the court indicated the same rule would apply
had the defendafit corporation been shown to be a mere change in the
partnership business structure. The dictum, it seems, overlooks the fact
that such a showing would in and of itself imply that the corporation
had assumed the partnership debts. This was brought out in Jones v.
Francis,2 Northwest Perfection Tire Co. v. Perfection 'Tire Corp.' and
Seattle I;zvesters' Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores.4 In each
case a new corporation, in substance merely the continuation of an old
corporation, was held liable for the latter's debts. In Bowyer v. Boss
Tweed-Clipper Gold Mines' the court quoted Fletcher, Cyclopedia of
Corporations, with approval, as follows:
The general rule, which is well settled is that where one company sells
or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not
144 Wn2d 102, 265 P2d 807 (1954). See also Contracts at page 93.
2 70 Wash. 676, 127 Pac. 307 (1912).
3 125 Wash. 84, 215 P.2d 360 (1925).
4 177 Wash. 125, 30 P2d 956 (1934).5 195 Wash. 25, 79 P.2d 713 (1938).
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liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor. . . .To render it
liable there must be an agreement, express or implied, to assume the other
company's debts and obligations; or the circumstances must warrant a
finding that .. . the purchasing company was a mere continuation of
the selling company.6
While these cases do not concern corporations created to succeed to
the assets and business of a partnership, the situation is analogous, and
it would seem that liability should follow to the new corporation
whether its predecessor was a partnership or a corporation. In Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of Corporations,' the better rule is said to be that a corpora-
tion is presumed to have assumed the partnership debts and is prima
facie liable therefor where no consideration has been paid for the
partnership assets, other than issuance of stock in the corporation, and
where the corporation has no other property or assets than those so
acquired. The case of Stowell v. Garden City News Corp.' exemplifies
the rule. There a corporation was formed by and consisted of members
of a partnership whose business and property were conveyed and trans-
ferred to the corporation in return for capital stock of the latter. The
corporation, which continued the business of the partnership, was pre-
sumed to have assumed the partnership debts and was prima facie
liable therefore.
As recognized by the court in the West Tenino case, a corporation
may be held to have impliedly assumed the obligations of its predeces-
sor. The question, then, becomes one as to the sufficiency of the estab-
lished facts and circumstances to raise the implication or presumption
that the corporation assumed the partnership debts and obligations. A
few decisions seemingly can be construed to state that a corporation,
which upon its organization succeeds to the business and property of a
partnership, is presumed to be a mere continuation of the latter and
thereby chargeable with its liabilities.9 The dictum in the West Tenino
case seems to indicate a willingness to go to the opposite extreme. That
is, the court seems reluctant to allow an inference of liability for the
debts of a partnership where the defendant corporation is shown to be
a mere change in the partnership business structure. The court would
not be alone if it so held." One view is that since the consideration for
6 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS 139, § 7122 (1938).
7 15 Id. 406, § 4014.
8 143 Kan. 840, 57 P2d 12 (1936).
Reed Bros. Co. v. First National Bank of Weeping Water, 46 Neb. 168, 64 N.W.
701 (1895) ; Austin v. Tecumseh National Bank, 49 Neb. 412, 68 N.W. 628 (1896).
10 See Taylor Lumber Co. v. Clark Lumber Co., 33 Ga. App. 815, 127 S.E. 905(1925) ("A corporation which lawfully acquires all the property of a partnership does
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the transfer of the partnership business is stock in the new corporation,
the transaction is not one in fraud of creditors, because the partners
continue liable as before, and with presumably as much property as
before. In effect, the shares of stock represent the property put into the
corporation and are available to the partnership creditors."
This latter view does not follow what, as set forth herein, is deemed
to be the better rule. Neither is it analogous to the view taken in the
Washington cases concerning assumption of liabilities when a corpora-
tion succeeds to the business and assets of another corporation. How-
ever, as indicated by the small number of Washington cases on the
subject of assumption of liabilities of a purchased business, the question
remains open, and the West Tenino dictum should not preclude a future
adoption of the rule creating an inference of liability in the new corpor-
ation for the old partnership debts when the former is merely a change
in the latter's business structure.
Power of President to Call Meeting of Stockholders. State Bank of
Wilbur v. Wilbur Mission Church'2 was an interpleader action by a
bank to determine title to church funds deposited with the clerk of
court. In determining which of two groups was entitled to certain cor-
porate offices, and thus who was ,entitled to the corporate funds, the
Supreme Court held that the president of a corporation generally has
no power to call a meeting of the stockholders or members, unless
bylaws or a resolution of the board of directors or trustees make it his
duty to do so. Such a rule was said to be as equally applicable to re-
ligious organizations as to corporations organized for profit.
This rule is so generally accepted that few cases raise the issue.'
Both Knoll v. Levert" and Dusenbury v. Looker, cited by the court
not thereby become responsible for the partnership debts, though the corporation has
the same name as the partnership, and the persons who constituted the partnership
own the entire capital stock of the corporation, and the business of the partnership has
been merged into that of the corporation"). Universal Pictures Corporation v. Ray
Davidge's Film Laboratory, 7 Cal. App.2d 366, 45 P2d 1028 (1935) ; Dickson-Carroll
Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 58 Ga. 540, 199 S.E. 322 (1938) ("The debts have to
be assumed in a manner recognized by law").
11 McLellan v. Detroit File Works, 56 Mich. 579, 23 N.W. 321 (1885); Nat'l Bank
v. Hollingsworth, 135 N.C. 566, 47 S.E. 618 (1904).
22 44 Wn2d 80, 265 P2d 821 (1954). See also Equity at page 142.
1s 5 FLETCHER, CYcLoPFDIA or CoRpoRArioNs 7, § 1997 (1938) ("The power and
duty of calling meetings is, in the absence of any statute or bylaw, in the directors."
At page 8: "Meetings of religious corporations are called according to their constitu-
tions and bylaws, if there is no statute upon the matter, the Stock Corporation Laws
being not generally applicable"). See Uzzell v. McClelland, 65 Colo. 324, 176 Pac. 304
(1918).
14 136 La. 241, 66 So. 949 (1914).
15110 Mich. 58, 67 N.W. 986 (1896).
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as authority for the rule, avoid the issue, since, according to the terms
of the corporate charters in those proceedings, the power to call a
meeting of the stockholders was expressly vested in the board of direc-
tors. However, the president and secretary of a church were held to be
without authority to issue a call in a Louisiana case16 preceding the
Knoll decision.
The Wilbur case illustrates the hazard of incorporating under RCW
24.08.010 et seq., a short, inadequate, and antiquated chapter relating
to educational, religious, benevolent, or charitable societies. If the
Wilbur Mission Church had been incorporated under RCW 24.04.010
et seq., relating to nonprofit, nonstock corporations, the conflict would
probably have been averted by the requirement that the members of
the corporation must meet and adopt bylaws before transacting any
business. The time, place, and manner of calling and conducting meet-
ings heads the list of suggested bylaw provisions under RCW 24.04.070.
Also, RCW 24.16.010 et seq., relating to associations for mutual bene-
fit and educational, charitable, etc., purposes, would have been a better
choice under which to incorporate than the one employed. Among other
provisions the statute provides for adoption of bylaws and delineates
the authority of trustees. Both RCW 24.04 and 24.16 are broad in
scope, and yet lend a degree of guidance to incorporators and a partial
framework from which the corporation may function. This cannot be
said of RCW 24.08.
WiLLiAM D. CAMERON
Corporations May Do Business Under Assumed Names. Seattle Association of Credit
Men v. Green, 145 Wash. Dec. 128, 273 P2d 513 (1954), was an action by the assignee
for benefit of all creditors of an insolvent corporation against certain specific creditors
of the corporation to recover a preferential payment. The Supreme Court held the
Uniform Business Corporation Act, (adopted 1933, RCW Title 23), does not preclude
a corporation from doing business under an assumed name. Funds of the insolvent
corporation, paid within four months of the corporation's assignment for benefit of
creditors by means of a check drawn under an assumed name used in transacting
business with a creditor, could be recovered by the assignee under RCW 23.48.030.
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Mechanics' Liens-Time for Filing of Claim. The filing of mechan-
ics' liens is governed in Washington by a statute which, in the part
pertinent to this inquiry, reads as follows:
No lien created by this chapter shall exist and no action to enforce the
16 State ex rel. Bellamore v. Rombotis, 120 La. 150, 45 So. 43 (1907).
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